Saturday 12 January 2013

What, and with which, and to whom, part 1

This week, I'm going to tackle the first half of an article that a friend of mine posted to Facebook quite some time ago. The article recaps ten arguments against gay marriage, and my intention is to deal with the first five in this installment, and then come back to the next five some time soon (i.e.: next week, if all goes according to plan). So, here goes.

#1: The first argument is that though marriage has evolved through time, all over the world it has been recognized as a union between one man and one woman for the purpose of raising children, which is the fundamental essence of marriage. The author claims that though it could change again, that is no reason to assume that it should.

The structure of this argument is as follows: marriage has been one way forever; therefore, it ought to remain that way. This is a fallacious argument. Nothing says that things ought to remain the way that they always have been. Adopting the same argument structure, I could conclude that there ought to be massive wealth disparities forever because there always have been up to now. So there's clearly a problem with this argument structure.

Secondly, there is a problem with the claim that marriage all over the world has recognized the fundamental essence of one man and one woman for the purpose of raising children. There are polygamous societies, which clearly don't fit that mold. There are also societies where children are raised by the community rather than by the immediate family alone (and in fact, our own society might learn a thing or two from that). Clearly, there are societies in which marriage has not been between one man and one woman, and where child rearing and marriage come apart.

It is false to claim that marriage has universally embraced this essence. And even if that were the case, that fact alone would not justify the claim that it ought not to change.

#2: Those supporting gay marriage claim that to exclude homosexual relationships from the recognition of marriage is unfair, that it treats people unequally. In response, the author argues that equality means treating similar things in a similar fashion, not treating different things equally. Any unmarried man is allowed to marry any unmarried woman, so we all have equal rights! Why are same-sex couples different? Because they cannot produce children, nor can they "ensure a child’s basic right to be raised by his mother and father" (which I'm not sure is a basic right, as the author presumes but does not justify). The author then concludes with the point that there are many benefits that come with marriage, and to allow homosexual couples access to these benefits would be an unfair favoring of homosexual over heterosexual relationships. That last point is entirely unclear to me, and the author doesn't do nearly enough to justify his claim. If two people are married and upon the death of one, the other receives the remaining pension, what does it matter whether the two are of the same or of different genders? How would it be an unfair advantage to leave that parameter unspecified?

The author's point here again relies on accepting the definition of "one man and one woman for the purpose of child rearing" as the essence of marriage, which he failed to support in his first point. Even if that is a big part of marriage, it certainly is far from its only feature. Love figures prominently in marriage, one would hope, as does the social stability of having a partner on whom one can rely, a confidant, etc. These are all important features of marriage (and if you want to know why so many of those fail these days, perhaps its because a man and a woman making a baby isn't all there is to marriage, as this author tries to convince us), and they can be just as easily true of homosexual as of heterosexual relationships. (Here is an interesting article on the benefits of a strong marital bond; recognize that these benefits seem equally applicable to gay as to straight marriage.)

As for raising children, adoption is certainly a reality in our world, so there's no reason that a homosexual relationship couldn't involve children. The author makes some toss-away claim about the fundamental right to be raised by one's own parents, but that's nowhere written in stone, and in many cases children are raised by aunts and uncles, grandparents, close friends, etc. Do we refuse marriage in those instances? Furthermore, as technology advances, the possibility of making a child that is the biological offspring of two same-sex parents becomes more and more of a reality, sidestepping the issue of raising "someone else's child."

#3: The author then moves on to address the claim that anyone may marry whomever he or she loves. In fact, the author claims, the government doesn't support marriage for the sake of love, but rather for the sake of children, and once again, because homosexual couples cannot raise children (which I again must press the author to consider more closely), the government should not sanction such marriages.

What the author again overlooks is that firmly entrenched within our society is the notion of a long-term, romantic, sexual relationship with a single partner. That notion also embraces the raising of a family, but the child-rearing aspect is not the only salient feature! Much of our sense of self and sense of worth is based on our relationships, and to have one's (arguably) most important relationship not be deemed worthy of public/official recognition is extremely damaging.

Furthermore, the social benefits of a romantic partnership, as in the pension example I mentioned above, are certainly values that the government has an interest in endorsing. Social services these days are strongly overburdened because children are no longer looking after their aging parents as they once did. Imagine how much worse the situation would get if aging spouses didn't look after one another. Part of looking after one another means sharing social benefits such as insurance and pensions, which are often linked to marriage. The government therefore has an interest in supporting as many such successful partnerships as they can find!

#4: Some same-sex marriage advocates say that whether they are allowed to marry or not is irrelevant to heterosexual couples, to which the author replies that to expand the definition of marriage would weaken the institution itself. Marriage is already about as diluted as American beer, so any further weakening would just break the darn thing, as people wouldn't take it seriously anymore.

Secondly, the author draws on an example from Toronto where a couple's desires for their child's education were overruled in the name of an education about tolerance. Thirdly, he believes that it threatens religious freedom.

The second and third issues are ones that I gather probably pull more weight with Americans than they will up north. Canadians don't get scared as easily by the prospect of having their children learn things that they don't agree with. Learning doesn't mean accepting, as many a parent probably already knows, and therefore to have tolerance included in the curriculum doesn't necessarily bring about tolerance. (Too bad, I know.) Furthermore, the religious freedom issue is not a hot-button topic up here the way it is for them southern folk. We certainly take it seriously, but when discussing the legal, not religious, definition of marriage, I think that most Canadians don't take it to be an assault on Christian values.

The first point, about the broadened definition weakening the institution, is actually one that deserves further inspection. It's true that opening up membership to an exclusive club can make it lose its cachet. But how much would the scope be widened, and what would be the principle according to which some are allowed and others not? I'll explore this issue more in #5.

#5: The author claims that if we break from the "one man one woman, for the purpose of making babies" definition, then we lose traction on where to draw the line. It's a slippery slope argument, which the author claims is not merely hypothetical: in some places where same-sex marriage is allowed, polygamous groups have sued for recognition as well. "When sexual love replaces children as the primary purpose of marriage, restricting it to just two people no longer makes sense." (First off, I'd like to point out the little jab at "sexual love," which presumably is being derided by comparison to "real" love. My spidey sense just tingles at that one.)

Once again, the author is begging the question. He assumes that polygamous relationships are not acceptable without offering any proof. According to his definition of marriage, of course it's not. But it's specifically that definition that's at issue here! It appeals to people's gut reaction against polygamy to motivate the fear of the slippery slope. One could just as easily flip the argument on its head and ask what, if anything, is wrong with polygamy. The point here is not to begin with assumptions about which marriages are acceptable and which aren't, and on that basis to formulate rules to justify one's position. Rather, one is supposed to be inspecting one's notions of marriage itself, and that includes inspecting our intuitions: what do we think about polygamy? And are those intuitions justified? Perhaps the proper response here is not to say that allowing same-sex marriage would also allow polygamy, and that's not acceptable. Perhaps the proper response is to say that we should also be examining our intuitions, trying to figure out why it is that up to now, most of us have taken it for granted that polygamy is wrong.

If we are open to reflect on that issue (and I'm not saying here that we must or even necessarily should allow polygamy), then we realise that the author is just trying to scare us out of considering the issue of same-sex marriage. What we should be doing is reflecting on the basis of marriage, not being scared out of doing so. Getting back to point #4, the issue of diluting marriage cannot be properly assessed until we find a new equilibrium point: what would the new basis of marriage be? Until that question is answered, the issue of how much marriage is diluted by its redefinition cannot be addressed. The scope of marriage can be widened by just weakening the rules, and there dilution might become a reasonable concern. But the scope can also be widened by adopting a different set of rules, one that valorises parts of marriage that we've already discussed here (e.g.: social stability) and that need not entail a weakening of the institution.





Anyway, that's all for me for this week. Until next time. Looking forward to some nice, heated debate on these cold winter days... though there are no such things in southern Ontario, apparently.

PS: The title is a reference to an amazing limerick about a whore from Khartoum. Totally worth checking out.

4 comments:

  1. 1&2. I think it's problematic to begin with "these are ten arguments against gay marriage" (which tenor you carry through your piece) when the article explicitly entitles them "rebuttals to ten arguments for gay marriage." Much of what would be fallacious argumentation if the conclusion were normative policy, as you take it to be, is not fallacious if the conclusion is only about which side should bear the burden of producing a prima facie argument, or about whether that prima facie argument could validly appeal to human rights or anti-discrimination. The maddening thing for a lot of principled Catholics is not that there are other people out there with differing substantive views who would like to enshrine them in law (haven't there always been?) but that at least in the U.S. context much of the argumentation presumes that the case for same-sex legal marriage can be made from a broadly Rawlsian political philosophy without appeal to comprehensive doctrines, which we think is hogwash and sophistry.

    3,4&5. Sure the success of a reductio absurdum always depends on whether your interlocutor is actually committed to the premise you show as threatened. Certain proponents of same-sex legal marriage are nonetheless attached to 2-person-marriage, marriage for the good of children, the Church's position in civil society, etc. Others aren't. Arguments that target the former won't hold any weight for the latter. That doesn't seem problematic to me.

    In particular, however, I think your claims from 3 & 5 need to be brought more closely together: if marriage is only about the recognition of long-term romance, it's unclear why the state should be involved at all, and even more unclear why many extant barriers (against polyamory, bigamy, adult incest, etc) should exist. If marriage is only about the protection of children and the aged, the rationale for state involvement becomes clear, but it seems like spinster siblings, etc should have access. This horn of the dilemma looks a lot like the "separate civil and religious marriage" plan. If proponents are comfortable with that horn (many are not, because they want state legitimation precisely for purposes of social status), then the further step is to weigh the positive impacts of that separation (consolidating legal rights for protection of the children and the aged in exceptional domestic situations) against its possible negative impacts (further weakening the normalization of life-long heterosexual bonds for the rearing of children).

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  2. Thanks for your comments, Ryan. You are indeed correct that the original article was about attempts to rebut arguments from the pro-same-sex-marriage side. However, when it comes to the burden of proof, it seems to me that the advantage resides with the same-sex marriage people: there are rights that are being granted to heterosexual couples to which same-sex couples do not have access. They provide some reasons; this article attempts to rebut those reasons, and my aim is to show that those rebuttals fail. The burden, then, continues to reside with those who would not have the definition changed, as I contend that the arguments coming from the same-sex side still carry weight, weight that is not dissolved by these unsuccessful rebuttals.

    The point that I'm hoping will emerge from my discussion is that if we're looking for comprehensive doctrines that are fair and just, we haven't found them yet.

    The premise threatened by reductio in 3, 4 and 5 certainly seems to be pretty central to this author's argument. That is certainly not to say that all those who would conserve marriage as is are committed to that premise. But the argument presented still lives or dies (and in this case, dies) on the strength of that premise, which I've shown to be lacking. If there is another argument, and I'm sure that there is, let it be brought forward for examination. But what this article offers won't do, so the burden of proof is back in their court.

    I also agree that it's unclear what role the state should have in this discussion. My argument is actually not necessarily in favour of accepting same-sex marriage; it's in favour of a re-examination and hopefully an improvement of the system. Allowing same-sex marriage is one proposal, but people such as the author of this rebuttal are against it. What I'm trying to show is that their arguments don't carry the weight that they hope they will, bringing us back to the need to sort out this unequal distribution of benefits that originally got us here. Allowing same-sex marriage is one possible avenue; further separating church and state by moving away from non-religious marriage is another. I'm not advocating either one, but I'm certainly advocating the need to fix the problem in the system that each attempts to solve in its own way.

    Should spinster siblings be allowed access to similar such benefits and sharing pensions? I absolutely believe that they should! That points in the direction that regardless of your feelings on same-sex marriage, there will still be other issues that it won't solve, and we need to be sensitive to those issues as well.

    As for the weakening of the normalizing feature of life-long heterosexual bonds, I think it's fair to ask whether that's such a benefit that we're simply not willing to jeopardize it. It has been a pillar of our society for centuries, but it seems to be changing. Should we dig in our heels and resist the change, or should we instead focus on trying to accommodate that change and ensure a smooth transition into some other (legal, social, civil) circumstance that would offer similar benefits to the society as a whole? I think that there are good arguments to be made on either side. My point here is just to make sure that the arguments made are good ones, and that requires the kind of critical examination that I hope to have offered here.

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    1. First, I think you're still unhelpfully conflating the policy argument with the meta-argument about burdens and rights. You say "there are rights that are being granted to heterosexual couples to which same-sex couples do not have access" but of course rights inhere in persons, not in couples, and so to suggest that marriage is a right that could be claimed by two same-sex persons is already to assume facts about the reference class for the right that are in dispute. Nobody in the debate believes that there's a right some people should have access to while others shouldn't. So you're basically assuming the conclusion in your assignment of burdens.

      Second, your dismissal of the rebuttals offered is based largely on the assumption that they are arguments at the policy level rather than rebuttals to your assumption about burdens above. When understood correctly, you haven't actually established them as fallacious.

      Third, this seems to be another case where more extreme "left" and "right" (at least in U.S. context) positions (which tend to be more principled, and hence more popular among academics) seem to converge on the idea of decoupling the current legal bundle around civil marriage. Meanwhile, those closer to the "center" either defend the status quo as such (fearing change generally) or want just their change (because adding same-sex relationships to the marriage bundle as currently constituted would be a validation that they are in the relevant similarity class, which is precisely what they would like to be acknowledged). I think that almost all of the burdens/rights jockeying and rhetoric around these more 'centrist' positions is basically circular (on both sides) and that's much of what the linked article is going after. So your position is largely consistent, but it's important to realize that you're going to leave many gay marriage proponents behind (as I am leaving many gay marriage antagonists behind).

      Finally, what evidence is on offer that "if we're looking for comprehensive doctrines that are fair and just, we haven't found them yet"?

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    2. I find it interesting that you claim that rights inhere in persons, not in couples. First off, could we not easily reduce those rights to the individuals? And second, what would be the problem in just refusing to reduce those rights to the component parts of the relationship, and just claim that they are the rights of the couple? Decades ago, nations were granted the right of self-determination. If a nation can have rights, why can't a couple? (Also, I realize that going do the road of national self-determination was a painful excursion for our planet and our species, but that wasn't the fault of trying to accord rights to groups, it was the fault of the specifics of exactly which rights and exactly which groups.)

      You're saying that I'm begging the question, and I while I disagree, I think that you rightfully point out that I need to be more clear in how I'm not doing just that. You are claiming that same-sex relationships are not in the same reference class as heterosexual relationships, and I am claiming the opposite. I make my claim on the basis of the fact that there are obviously features in common to the two types of relationships (which I gather you don't deny), and the rejoinder is that these features in common are not the relevant ones when it comes to marriage. However, I'm disputing that rejoinder, and think that I have shifted the burden of proof back to the other team. Why are the aspects common to homosexual and heterosexual relationships not the salient ones? And furthermore, what are? What I'm looking for are the bases for the rights of heterosexual couples, such that those bases preclude the enjoyment by homosexual couples of those same rights. So far, nothing written here has convinced me: the original rebuttals piece is weak and superficial, as I demonstrated, and I can't discern any tangible alternatives from what you've said.

      I realize that I'm mostly (if not entirely) attacking policy issues, but because those issues are linked to definitions of marriage that overstep the boundaries of civil engagements, it will necessarily implicate some religious aspects in there as well.

      And this brings me to your final point. Am I going to leave many gay marriage proponents behind? "Frankly, my dear, I don't give a damn." My position is that proponents of gay marriage have a point: they're getting a raw deal, because couples that are quite like them in the relevant senses (and again, please show me where you think that goes wrong!) are getting social benefits to which same-sex couples have no access. That's why our current doctrines are unfair. In that respect, I agree with those proponents.

      However, I'm not sure that just tacking same-sex marriage onto the religious definition is necessarily the best answer, and in that I probably part ways with a good many proponents of gay marriage. What I'm suggesting is that we, as a society, need to examine and reflect upon the way that we view relationships in our lives (romantic and otherwise, as the old sibling spinsters case points out) and how they are connected with social benefits, as well as public recognition.

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